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NOTES
Criminal Procedure-United States v. MacDonald: Continued
Uncertainty in the Right to a Speedy Trial
The sixth amendment speedy trial guarantee' is a fundamental right 2 of
an accused 3 in a criminal proceeding. 4 Although this right protects "basic de-
mands" of Anglo-American criminal justice,5 the United States Supreme
Court has dealt with it infrequently.6 A recent decision has clarified the juris-
prudence of this "slippery" and "amorphous" constitutional protection 7 while
simultaneously creating new ambiguity through dictum that proclaims the rel-
evance of governmental bad faith in prosecutorial delay.8 ]In a case of first
impression, the Court in United States v. MacDonald9 considered whether
prosecutorial delay between the dismissal of military charges and the return of
1. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial... ." U.S. Const. amend. VI. See generally J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
ACCUSED: PRETRIAL RIGHTs ch. 7 (1972 & Supp. 1979); IA R. KRAUSE, CRIMINAL DEFENSE
TECHNIQUES § 19 (1969 & Supp. 1981); 3 F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§§ 420-422 (12th ed. 1975 & Supp. 1981); C. WHITEBREAD, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE 265-72 (1978); Solomon, The Right to a Speedy Trial- A Manualfor Lawyers, Judges and
Legislators, 3 J. MAR. 1 (1978); Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 57 COLUM L. REV. 846 (1957);
Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REV. 476 (1968); Note, The Lagging Right to a
Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REV. 1587 (1965).
2. "Klopfer v. N.C., 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967), established that the right to a speedy trial is
'fundamental'." Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515 (1972).
3. The word "accused" means "only the person who has standing to complain of
prosecutorial delay . United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 328 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
4. For a succinct summary of the Anglo-American common-law origins of the right to a
speedy trial, see Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 223-26.
5. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1969). In Hooey petitioner was indicted and con-
victed on federal charges. After state charges were filed, petitioner unsuccessfully requested a
speedy trial on those indictments. Finding that the six-year prosecutorial delay violated peti-
tioner's sixth amendment rights, the Supreme Court held that a state has a constitutional duty to
bring a federal prisoner before state court on state charges upon that prisoner's request. Id. at 383.
Hooey refers to "basic demands" ofjustice that the sixth amendment safeguards. Id. at 378.
Those demands were enumerated in United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966). See infra text
accompanying note 46.
6. Barker, 407 U.S. at 515; Marion, 404 U.S. at 315 n.7.
7. The Supreme Court characterized the speedy trial right in these terms in Barker, 407 U.S.
at 522. See also Joseph, Speedy TrialRights in Application, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 611, 612 (1980).
Perhaps the Court has found the right to a speedy trial to be "slippery" and "amorphous"
because it "is generically different from any of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for
the protection of the accused." Barker, 407 U.S. at 519. It is unique because the concern for fair
and decent treatment of the accused must be weighed against the "societal interest in providing a
speedy trial which exists separately from, and at times in opposition to, the interests of the ac-
cused." Id. The accused also may benefit from deprivation of the right. Id. at 521. Finally, the
right is "a more vague concept" than other procedural protections. Id.
8. See infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
9. 102 S. Ct. 1497 (1982). MacDonald marked the first time a soldier was prosecuted by
civilian authorities after being cleared of military charges. 531 F.2d 196, 199 (4th Cir. 1976) [here-
inafter cited as MacDonald1], rev'd on grounds ofprematurity, 435 U.S. 850 (1978), on remand, 485
F. Supp. 1087 (1979), rev'd, 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1497 (1982).
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a civilian indictment violated the sixth amendment.10 In attempting to resolve
differences among the lower federal courts, I I the Court held that the right to a
speedy trial does not attach to the period between charges, 12 and noted in
dictum that no evidence existed that the government acted in bad faith by
dismissing the initial charge.' 3
In the early morning of February 17, 1970, the military police at Fort
Bragg, North Carolina, responded to a call from Captain Jeffrey R. MacDon-
ald.' 4 Upon their arrival at the MacDonald home, the police found MacDon-
ald's wife and two children brutally murdered and MacDonald unconscious
from multiple stab wounds. Although MacDonald later told of a "bizarre and
ritualistic murder,"' 5 physical evidence at the scene contradicted his ac-
count.16 After a ten-week investigation by the Army Criminal Investigation
Division (CID), the military formally charged MacDonald with the murders.
Pursuant to Article 32 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 17 the military
conducted a lengthy hearing on the charges.' 8 Based on the Article 32 hear-
ing, military authorities dismissed the charges in October 1970 for lack of evi-
dence. In December 1970, the Army granted MacDonald an honorable
discharge based on hardship. 19
At the request of the Justice Department, the CID continued to investi-
gate the three murders. Although the CID submitted its report to the Justice
Department in June 1972,20 a grand jury was not convened until August 1974.
During this twenty-six month period, little additional evidence was devel-
oped.21 Five years after the crime, MacDonald was indicted.22 Although the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district
10. 102 S. Ct. at 1499.
11. See infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text.
12. 102 S. Ct. at 1502.
13. Id. at 1503 n.12. See also infra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
14. MacDonald was a physician in the Army Medical Corps and was stationed at Fort Bragg.
15. 102 S. Ct. at 1499-1500, 1500 n.2. MacDonald described a macabre scene reminiscent of
the infamous Manson murders. He claimed "he saw a woman with blond hair wearing a floppy
hat, white boots and a short skirt carrying a lighted candle and chanting 'acid is groovy; kill the
pigs'" before being attacked by three men. Id. at 1499-1500. Military police apparently saw a
woman close to that description near the MacDonald home. Id. at 1499 n.l. That evidence lent a
measure of credence to MacDonald's allegations.
16. For the physical evidence that contradicted MacDonald's version of events, see 102 S.Ct.
at 1500 n.2.
17. 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1976). The Uniform Code of Military Justice is codified at 10 U.S.C. ch.
47 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). For a discussion of Article 32 hearings, see E. BYRNE, MILITARY LAW§§ 319-320 (1976); Everett, The New Look in Military Justice, 1973 DUKE L.J. 649.
18. Fifty-six witnesses testified in the Article 32 hearing. 102 S. Ct. at 1500.
19. Id. As a result of the discharge, the military no longer had jurisdiction over MacDonald.
Id at 1500 n.3 (citing United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955)).
20. This report consisted of 13 volumes. Id at 1500.
21. Id. at 1504-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The CID transmitted two supplemental reports
to the Justice Department during this period. These reports notwithstanding, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that "no significant new investigation was undertaken. . . and none was
pursued until the grand jury was convened a year later." MacDonald 1, 531 F.2d at 206.
22. 102 S. Ct. at 1500. MacDonald was indicted on three counts of first degree murder.
Federal jurisdication existed because the crimes were committed on a military reservation. 18
U.S.C. §§ 7(3), 1111, & 3231 (1977).
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court's denial of MacDonald's pretrial sixth amendment claim 23 the Supreme
Court reversed and remanded for trial, holding that speedy trial claims are not
subject to interlocutory appeal.24 On appeal following MacDonald's convic-
tion in federal district court, the Fourth Circuit set aside the judgment on
speedy trial grounds.25
In reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court assumed that Mac-
Donald was an "accused" for sixth amendment purposes while charged with
murder by the military.26 The threshold question, therefore, was whether
23. 102 S.Ct. at 1500. This was the first of two interlocutory appeals heard by the circuit
court in the MacDonald case. First, MacDonald appealed the district court's denial of his speedy
trial and double jeopardy claims. MacDonald 1, 531 F.2d at 199. On the speedy trial question,
the court found that MacDonald became an "accused" for sixth amendment purposes once he was
charged with murder by the military. Id. at 202-05. Without considering the significance to
speedy trial analysis of the dismissal of military charges, the Fourth Circuit held that the four and
one-half year delay between the Army accusation and the filing of the civilian indictment violated
MacDonald's sixth amendment rights. Id. at 205-08.
Having granted MacDonald's appeal on speedy trial grounds, the Fourth Circuit declined to
consider the double jeopardy question. Noting the unsettled nature of military law on this point,
the court opined that the resolution depended "on the legal effect of the acceptance of an Article
32 recommendation by the commanding officer." Id. at 209.
24. 435 U.S. 850 (1978). On the second interlocutory appeal, the Fourth Circuit decided the
double jeopardy question. Affirming the district court, the court of appeals held that conducting a
civilian trial after the military dismissed charges did not violate the fifth amendment. United
States v. MacDonald, 585 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1978).
25. 632 F.2d 258 (4th Cir. 1980),rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 1497 (1982) [hereinafter cited as MacDonald
II]. MacDonald1! predicated its analysis on the initial Fourth Circuit panel's conclusion "that
MacDonald's military arrest was the functional equivalent of a civilian arrest." MacDonald!, 531
F.2d at 204. Therefore, it triggered his speedy trial protections. Not questioning whether the
protections were applicable after military charges were dismissed, MacDonald11 built further on
the fact analysis of MacDonald!, id at 202-08, and held that prosecutorial delay violated Mac-
Donald's sixth amendment rights. 632 F.2d at 260.
Although MacDonald also appealed on the grounds that prosecutorial delay denied him due
process of law, the Fourth Circuit declined to consider that issue because "the burden on Mac-
Donald to show an abuse of constitutional proportions under the Sixth Amendment could not be
greater than his burden under the Fifth Amendment .. " Id.
26. The Court did not express any opinion on whether military proceedings had made Mac-
Donald an accused in the sixth amendment sense. In its petition for certiorari, the government
had declined to raise that issue. 102 S. Ct. at 1502 n.10. For arguments that the military proceed-
ings made MacDonald an accused within the meaning of the sixth amendment, see MacDonald!,
531 F.2d at 202-05; Schumann, Did Captain MacDonald Receive a Speedy Trial?, 54 CONN. B.J.
69, 76-79 (1980). For opposing arguments, see MacDonald I, 531 F.2d at 209-14 (Craven, J.,
dissenting); Note, Right to Speedy Trial in Civilian Prosecution Denied by Delay Following Dismissal
of Military Charges-United States v. MacDonald, 17 WAKE FOREST L. Rav. 89, 92 (1981).
Because the Fourth Circuit had declined to express a view on whether the delay in bringing
MacDonald to trial violated his fifth amendment rights, the Court left that issue to be decided on
remand. 102 S. Ct. at 1500 n.5. On remand, the Fourth Circuit held that the two-year interval
between the dismissal of military charges and the grand jury's convocation did not deprive Mac-
Donald of due process of law. Noting that a demonstration of actual prejudice is necessary to
establish a fifth amendment violation, the court stated that claims of actual prejudice are not to be
explored unless the prosecutorial delay violates fundamental conceptions ofjustice. 688 F.2d 224,
226-27 (1982). Relying on the Supreme Court's finding that "[tihe care obviously given the matter
by the Justice Department is certainly not any indication of bad faith or deliberate delay," the
Fourth Circuit concluded that the delay was not contrary to the fundamental conceptions ofjus-
tice standard. 688 F.2d at 227 (quoting MacDonald, 102 S. Ct. 1503 n.12). This was "conclusive of
the Lovasco test and fatal to the appellant's Fifth Amendment argument." Id.
The Fourth Circuit also rejected MacDonald's claims of evidentiary error. .d. at 277. With
no additional claims of error to be resolved, this phase of the judicial saga of Captain Jeffrey R.
MacDonald had come to a close.
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MacDonald remained an accused after the dismissal of those charges. 27 In
holding that the speedy trial guarantee had no application until after Mac-
Donald was charged for a second time, the Court first studied the language of
th sixth amendment. 28 Based on "literal reading," the Court found that the
right to a speedy trial attached "only when a formal criminal charge is insti-
tuted and a criminal prosecution begins."'29 Analyzing United States v.
Marion30 and its progeny,31 the Court held that the right was applicable only
as long as the defendant was "indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially ac-
cused." 32 Reasoning that the time between dismissal and reindictment was
analogous to the preaccusation period, the Court found that undue delay after
dismissal was to be "scrutinized" under the due process rather than the speedy
trial standard.33
The determination that the speedy trial right did not apply to the period
between the dismissal of charges and the return of a new indictment, the Court
concluded, was in accordance with the policies underlying the sixth amend-
ment. 34 The Court posited that the speedy trial clause is designed to protect
the accused from lengthy pretrial incarceration, to minimize the anxiety
caused by public accusation, and to shorten the disruption caused by arrest. 3s
The majority concluded that these interests are not served by applying the
sixth amendment after charges are dropped. Once charges are dropped, the
defendant no longer is an accused. A "formerly accused," such as MacDonald,
is "in the same position as any other subject of a criminal investigation." 36
In a strong dissent, Justice MarshalH argued that the speedy trial clause
protects an individual for the entire period between the initial charge and the
27. 102 S. Ct. at 1499. Neither MacDonald I nor MacDonald 11 considered this question.
See supra notes 23 & 25.
28. Id. at 1501.
29. Id.
30. 404 U.S. 307 (1971). See also infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
31. See 102 S. Ct. at J501 & n.7, 1502 & nn.8-9. Seealso infra notes 56-75 and accompanying
text.
32. Id. at 1501.
33. Id. On remand, the Fourth Circuit held that the two-year delay between the dismissal of
military charges and the filing of a civilian indictment did not violate MacDonald's right to due
process. See supra note 26.
34. Id. at 1501-03. The Court also noted that its holding was consistent with the Speedy
Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1976). 102 S. Ct. at 1501 n.7. The Act provides that
the period between the dismissal of an earlier indictment and the return of a second indictment for
the same offense "shall be excluded . . in computing the time within which trial of any such
offense must commence." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6) (1976). Although this section is restricted to
dismissals of indictments, Congress has suggested that it applies to dismissals of complaints as
well. S. REP. No. 1023, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1974). The Speedy Trial Act, however, was not at
issue in the MacDonald case. The Act applies only to persons arrested or served with summons
after July 1, 1976. 18 U.S.C. § 3163 (1976). Even if the Act had been applicable, it would have
been subject to constitutional scrutiny. In ruling as it did, however, the Court implicitly upheld
the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(6). For a comprehensive analysis of the Act, see
Frase, The Speedy TrialAct of 1974, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 667 (1976).
35. 102 S. Ct. at 1502.
36. Id. The Court also stated that "[flollowing dismissal of charges, any restraint on liberty,
disruption of employment, strain on financial resources, and exposure to public obloquy, stress
and anxiety is no greater than it is upon anyone openly subject to a criminal investigation." Id.
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time the government either secures a conviction or closes the investigation.37
Criticizing the majority for disregarding the sixth amendment's language,3 8
precedents of the Court,3 9 and speedy trial policies, 40 Justice Marshall ex-
amined the four speedy trial factors of Barker v. Wingo4' and concluded that
MacDonald's rights had been violated by the twenty-six month delay between
the time the Justice Department received the Army's report and convened the
grand jury.42
A brief survey of previous Supreme Court speedy trial decisions is a pre-
requisite to understanding the MacDonald holding. The Court began tracing
the contours of this sixth amendment guarantee in Beavers v. Haubert.43 In
Beavers the Court established that the right to a speedy trial is necessarily
relative and that its application depends on the circumstances of a particular
case. Enunciating two principles that have formed the basis of subsequent
decisions, the Court stated that the sixth amendment "secures rights" to a de-
fendant in a criminal prosecution and, at the same time, "does not preclude
the rights of public justice."44
The Supreme Court did not articulate the protections afforded a defend-
ant under the first Beavers principle until United States v. Ewell. 4 5 In Ewell
37. Id. at 1504-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting; Brennan, Blackmun, JJ., joining). Although Jus-
tice Stevens concurred in the judgment, he agreed with the dissenters "that MacDonald's constitu-
tional right to a speedy trial was not suspended during the period between the Army's dismissal of
the charges in 1970 and the return of the civilian indictment in 1975." Id. at 1503 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
38. Id. at 1505. Justice Marshall stated that "a natural reading of the language is that the
Speedy Trial Clause continues to protect one who has been accused of a crime until the govern-
ment has completed its attempts to try him for that crime." Id.
39. Id. at 1505-06.
40. Id. at 1507-08. Justice Marshall stated:
The special anxiety that a defendant suffers because of a public accusation does not
disappear simply because the initial charges are temporarily dismissed. Especially when
the defendant and the public are aware of an ongoing government investigation of the
same charges, the defendant's interest in final resolution of the charges remains acute.
After all, the government has revealed the seriousness of its threat of prosecution by
initially bringing charges.
Id. at 1507.
41. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
42. 102 S. Ct. at 1508-10. Justice Marshall did not analyze the preceding period during
which the military reinvestigated MacDonald because "the prior dismissal for insufficient evi-
dence warranted a more extensive investigation." The period between the civilian indictment and
trial also was not included in the speedy trial calculus because any delays were caused primarily
by defense maneuvers. Id. at 1509 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a discussion of some of these
maneuvers, see supra notes 23 & 26.
43. 198 U.S. 77 (1905). In Beavers defendant was indicted on federal charges in the Eastern
District of New York. While the indictment was pending, the government initiated proceedings in
the Eastern District to remove defendant to the District of Columbia for trial on separate indict-
ments. Rejecting defendant's claim that removal would violate his right to a speedy trial, the
Court held that the sixth amendment, "if it has any application to the order of trials of different
indictments, .. must relate to the time of trial, not to the place of trial." Id. at 86.
44. Id.
45. 383 U.S. 116 (1966). In Ewell defendants were indicted and convicted of illegally selling
narcotics. After their sentences were vacated because of a deficiency in the original indictment,
defendants were rearrested on new complaints and reindicted. Rejecting the argument that the
19-month period between the original arrests and the hearings on the second indictment consti-
tuted an automatic speedy trial violation, the Court held that defendants had to demonstrate that
1983]
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the Court held that the speedy trial right is designed "to prevent undue and
oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern ac-
comapanying public accusation, and to limit the possibilities that long delay
will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself. '46 Subsequent deci-
sions have incorporated the speedy trial interests identified in Ewell.
Applying the second Ewell protection, the Supreme Court elaborated
upon the speedy trial interests of defendants in I/opfer v. North Carolina.47
The State in Klopfer used a nolleprosequi with leave to postpone indefinitely
the prosecution of an indictment. Although defendant was released from cus-
tody under this North Carolina procedure,48 the indictment remained in effect,
and the statute of limitations was tolled.49 Concluding that the "pendency of
the indictment" indefinitely subjected defendant to the "anxiety and concern
accompanying public accusation," 50 the Court held that the State had violated
defendant's sixth amendment rights.51
Defining when the speedy trial guarantee becomes applicable to a crimi-
nal prosecution, the Court in United States v. Marion5 2 considered the consti-
tutional significance of a lengthy preindictment delay. Claiming that the
government had sufficient evidence to press charges thirty-eight months ear-
lier, defendants argued that the preindictment delay prejudiced their sixth
amendment rights.53 Finding that defendants were not "accused" during the
preindictment investigatory period,54 the Court held that the right to a speedy
trial attaches only after the filing of "a formal indictment or information." In
the classic exposition of the interests protected by the sixth amendment, the
Court stated: "Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the de-
fendant's liberty,... disrupt his employment, drain his financial resources,
curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in
him, his family and friends."55 Nowhere in Marion, however, did the Court
the potentially prejudicial delay was purposeful rather than the result of ordinary criminal safe-
guards and procedures. Id. at 118-20.
46. .d. at 120.
47. 386 U.S. 213 (1967). Recognizing the right to a speedy trial as a fundamental constitu-
tional right, Klopfer also established that the sixth amendment was applicable to the states by
virtue of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 222, 225-26.
In Klopfer defendant, a zoology professor at Duke University, was indicted for criminal tres-
pass. After 18 months had passed since the indictment without the State's scheduling the case for
trial, defendant petitioned the court to learn his status. In response to defendant's motion, the
State requested and received from the court permission to take a nolleprosequl with leave. Id. at
217-18.
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-175 (repealed 1973).
49. K/opfer, 386 U.S. at 215. The prosecution did not need court permission to reschedule
the trial. Id.
50. Id. at 222 (quoting Ewell, 383 U.S. at 120).
51. 386 U.S. at 222.
52. 404 U.S. 307 (1971). In Marion defendants were indicted for acts of fraud and misrepre-
sentation carried out over a two-year period. Id. at 308-10.
53. Id. at 310.
54. Id. at 319-20. For the Marion Court's discussion of the term "accused," see id. at 313-20.
See also id. at 328 (Douglas, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 320.
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consider how these speedy trial interests might be affected by the dismissal of
criminal charges.
Although Dillingham v. United States5 6 did not touch upon the question
whether the sixth amendment would be suspended after charges were dis-
missed, the Court did clarify dictum from Marion .57 Finding that the twenty-
two months between arrest and indictment counted for speedy trial purposes,
the court held that the sixth amendment attached upon arrest and the filing of
charges as well as upon the issuance of a formal indictment. 58
Later in the term in which Marion was decided, the Supreme Court in
Barker v. Wingo59 defined the criteria by which the speedy trial claims of an
accused are judged. Defendant in Barker was not tried for more than five'
years after his arrest. Rejecting an "inflexible" analytical framework,60 the
Court adopted an "ad hoe" four-factor balancing test "in which the conduct of
both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed." 6' After balancing the
length of delay, the reason for delay, the defendant's assertion of this right,
and prejudice to the defendant, the Court concluded that Barker's sixth
amendment rights had not been violated.62
Five years after Marion, the Supreme Court in United States v. Lovasco 63
analyzed the scope of the due process protections against preindictment delay.
In Lovasco little information, aside from the investigative report submitted
one month after the crime, was developed in the eighteen months prior to
indictment. 4 Stating that the due process clause "has a limited role to play in
protecting against oppressive delay," 65 the Court set forth a standard of proof
for due process violations more difficult to satisfy than that required under
Barker for speedy trial claims. The due process standard was a demonstration
of actual prejudice rather than merely the potential for prejudice.66 Once a
defendant has established a possible claim by proving prejudicial delay,
56. 423 U.S. 64 (1975). In Dillingham defendant was arrested for automobile theft. He was
indicted 22 months later and was tried a year after that. Id. at 64.
57. In dictum, the Marion Court stated that the speedy trial right also was triggered by
"charge or arrest." 404 U.S. at 319. See also Note, supra note 26, at 95 n.60.
58. 423 U.S. at 64-65.
59. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). In Barker defendant was arrested and charged with murder. The
government did not try defendant until after his accomplice, against whom there was a stronger
case, was convicted. Until his trial, defendant was free on bail. Id. at 516-18.
60. The Court rejected the "fixed-time period" and "demand-waiver" rules. Id. at 529-30.
61. Id. at 530. Before Barker, the Court determined whether an accused had been denied his
sixth amendment rights by applying the speedy trial policies set forth in Ewell, 383 U.S. at 120.
For a discussion of those policies, see supra text accompanying note 46. For applications of those
policies, see e.g. 'Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 36-38 (1970) (eight year pretrial prosecutorial
delay violated speedy trial guarantee); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 378-80 (1969) (for a discus-
sion of the Hooey decision, see supra note 5).
62. 407 U.S. at 530-36. If the delay is not long enough to call into question whether the
defendant received a speedy trial, the other three Barker factors will not come into play. Id. For
applications of the balancing test, see Rudstein, Right to a Speedy Trial: Barker v. Wingo in the
Lower Courts, 1975 U. ILL.L.F. 11, 16-18.
63. 431 U.S. 783 (1977). In Lovasco defendant was indicted for firearms violations.
64. The government continued its investigation throughout the period. Id. at 786, 794-95.
65. Id. at 789.
66. See MacDonald 1, 531 F.2d at 207.
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Lovasco states that the "inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as
well as the prejudice to the accused." 67 Based on this analysis, the Court con-
cluded that defendant had not been deprived of due process of law.68
The guidelines set out in Marion, Barker, and Lovasco have given rise to
an array ofjudicial decisions from the circuit courts of appeal. In the absence
of Supreme Court guidance on when the speedy trial guarantee becomes dis-
engaged, conflicting lines of cases have developed not only among the circuit
courts, but also within the individual circuits. 69 While four cases support the
Court's holding in MacDonald,70 and three support Justice Marshall's dis-
sent,7 ' most do neither.
67. 431 U.S. at 790.
68. Id. at 796.
69. Only the First, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have held consistently that the speedy trial
right applies between the dismissal of charges and the reindictment for the same offense. The
Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits, in contrast, have held, at least on
occasion, that this sixth amendment protection is inapplicable to the period from dismissal to
reindictment. For the circuit court speedy trial decisions, see infra notes 70-75.
70. See United States v. Hillegas, 578 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1978); Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F,2d
1377 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Martin, 543 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1050 (1977); United States v. Bishton, 463 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
In Hillegas defendant was charged with conspiracy to distribute narcotics. Because the prose-
cution's witnesses stopped cooperating, the government dismissed the complaint. Once the wit-
nesses again agreed to cooperate three years later, however, the Government charged defendant
with narcotics conspiracy for the second time. Construing the Current Plan of the Southern Dis-
trict of New York for implementing the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, the Second Circuit held that
postdismissal periods were not to be considered in determining compliance with the time limits of
the Act. 578 F.2d at 454-58.
In Arnold defendant was charged with robbery and assault with a deadly weapon. Prior to
his arrest on this complaint, defendant was incarcerated on an unrelated murder charge. Follow-
ing defendant's murder conviction, the State dismissed the robbery-assault indictment. After de-
fendant was acquitted of murder on retrial, however, the State filed a second complaint on the
robbery-assault charges. In adjudicating defendant's speedy trial appeal following his conviction,
the Ninth Circuit found that defendant was not an "accused" during the time between the dismis-
sal of charges and rearrest. 566 F.2d at 1380-81, 1383.
In Martin defendant was charged with counterfeiting. Two years after the dismissal of the
original complaint, defendant was indicted for the same counterfeiting offense. On appeal follow-
ing defendant's conviction, the Sixth Circuit held that the speedy trial clause was not applicable to
the period between the dismissal of charges and the filing of the indictment. 543 F.2d at 578-79.
In Bishlon defendant was arrested and indicted under the District of Columbia Code for
soliciting and accepting a bribe. The indictment, however, was dismissed for a violation of a
statutory technicality. Three months later, a federal indictment was brought. Following his con-
viction 20 months after the initial arrest, defendant appealed on speedy trial grounds. Noting that
the Government had not acted in bad faith, the District of Columbia Circuit found that the sixth
amendment was not applicable to the period between the two indictments because no prosecution
was pending against defendant. 463 F.2d at 889-91.
71. Jones v. Morris, 590 F.2d 684 (7th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 965 (1979);
United States v. Roberts, 548 F.2d 665 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 920 (1977); United States v.
Merrick, 464 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972).
In Jones defendant was arrested and indicted for murder. Four months after moving success-
fully to dismiss the indictment, the State issued a second indictment charging defendant with the
same offense. At trial 23 months after his arrest, defendant was convicted. On appeal, the Sev-
enth Circuit found that defendant's speedy trial protection was engaged continuously during the
period from arrest to trial. 590 F.2d at 685-87.
In Roberts defendants were arrested for robbing a bank while taking part in a prison "work
release" program. Because defendants were still in prison, the Government dropped the original
charge. After defendants were paroled, however, the Government secured a second indictment on
the bank robbery charge. Twenty-six months after the first arrest, the trial began. Following
conviction, defendants appealed on speedy trial grounds. Although the court noted that no evi-
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The lower court cases that support neither the MacDonald majority nor
the dissenters construe the period between dismissal and the filing of a subse-
quent indictment in four different ways. First, courts have declined to reach
the question whether the speedy trial right applies when the defendant's ap-
peal would fail under the Barker analysis regardless of whether the sixth
amendment protection attached at the initial arrest or at the filing of the sec-
ond charge.7 2 Second, courts have conducted the Lovasco due process analy-
sis with respect to the period between dismissal and reindictment without
considering whether the speedy trial clause also applies.73 Third, courts have
applied the Barker balancing test to the period between charges when the
prosecution arguably has acted in bad faith by forum shopping or stockpiling
charges against the defendant.74 Fourth, courts also have held that "if the
dence existed of prosecutorial bad faith, the Sixth Circuit found that the sixth amendment right
applied continuously from the time of the initial arrest. 548 F.2d at 667-68.
In Merrick defendant was charged with income tax evasion. Nine months after the indict-
ment was dismissed for technical reasons, the Government handed down a second indictment. On
appeal following defendant's conviction, the Tenth Circuit included in the speedy trial calculus
the period between the dismissal of the initial charge and the second indictment. 464 F.2d at
1089-90.
72. See United States v. Henry, 615 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir.); United States v. Lai Ming Tanu,
589 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1978).
In Henry defendant was arrested for violating a federal statute prohibiting the delivery of a
firearm to a common carrier for shipment in interstate commerce without first providing the car-
rier with written notice. The complaint was dismissed soon afterwards, however, to facilitate a
state investigation of defendant's role in an attempted murder. With the state investigation com-
pleted, the Government secured an indictment on the firearms charge. Rejecting defendant's
speedy trial appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that whether the delay was measured from indictment
to trial or from original charge to trial was immaterial. The result would be the same, because the
one year delay between the original arrest and the trial was not impermissible under the Barker
standard. 615 F.2d at 1225-27, 1232-33, 1233 n.13.
In Tanu defendant was arrested by a joint federal-state task force and charged under state
law with conspiracy to distribute heroin. After the 27-month-old state indictment was dismissed
for speedy trial violations, federal authorities initially did not take any action. After new informa-
tion surfaced, however, defendant was indicted for the same transaction by a federal grand jury.
Taking note of the 20-month delay between the dismissal of state charges and the filing of the
federal indictment, the Second Circuit found that defendant had not shown potential prejudice
resulting from the loss of evidence. Because defendant's sixth amendment claim would fail under
the Barker analysis whether or not delay was measured from the dismissal of state charges, the
court declined to decide whether the speedy trial clause applied continuously to successive state
and federal prosecutions. 589 F.2d at 83-85, 88-89.
See also United States v. Santos, 588 F.2d 1300 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979).
73. See United States v. Davis, 487 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 981 (1974).
In Davis defendants were indicted for bank robbery. Five months later, the charge was dismissed
to permit the Government to bring conspiracy charges. Seventeen months thereafter, the conspir-
acy trial began. On appeal following conviction, defendants claimed that the delays violated their
speedy trial rights or, in the alternative, due process of law. Treating the five-month period be-
tween the bank robbery and conspiracy charges as preindictment delay, the Fifth Circuit analyzed
the next 17 months under the due process standard. The court did not consider whether the
speedy trial clause applied to this period. 487 F.2d at 115-18.
74. See United States v. Avalos, 541 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. McKim, 509
F.2& 769 (5th Cir. 1975).
In Avalos defendants were arrested on federal narcotics charges in the District of Columbia.
Nine months later, defendants were indicted in the Southern District of Florida on charges arising.
from the same narcotics conspiracy for which they previously had been arrested. The Govern-
ment brought the indictments in Florida because the judicial climate was peroeived as more hospi-
table than in the District of Columbia. Following their convictions at trial, defendants appealed
on speedy trial grounds. The Fifth Circuit found that the government had engaged in a deliberate
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crimes for which a defendant is ultimately prosecuted really only gild the
charge underlying his initial arrest. . . ,the initial arrest may well mark the
speedy trial provision's applicability as to prosecution for all the interrelated
offenses." '75
Faced with these few decisions delineating the scope and nature of the
speedy trial clause, the Supreme Court decided United States v. MacDonald.
In holding that the dismissal of military charges suspended the application of
the sixth amendment, the Court did not have much guidance from its previous
rulings. Ewell defined the purposes of the speedy trial clause. 76 Marion held
that an individual became an accused upon the filing of an indictment or in-
formation, but did not indicate how long one remained an accused.77 The
Court's subsequent speedy trial decisions also did not consider when the right
became disengaged. Barker outlined a four-factor balancing test that was rel-
evant only while the conclusory label "accused" applied.78 Lovasco provided
the due process framework for analyzing prosecutorial delay prior to accusa-
tion.79 The Court's task was further complicated because lower court cases
did not delineate a clear line on either side of the issue.80
attempt at forum shopping, and applied the Barker analysis to the 15 months between the initial
arrest in the District of Columbia and the filing of the indictment in Florida. 541 F.2d at 1104-06,
1110-17.
In McKim defendant was arrested for marijuana smuggling. Before being charged with the
crime, defendant escaped from federal custody. After being taken back into custody, defendant
was tried for marijuana smuggling while the government held off prosecuting the escape charge.
Once the marijuana conviction was reversed, however, defendant was indicted for escape from
federal custody. In deciding defendant's speedy trial appeal, the Fifth Circuit applied the speedy
trial clause to the one-year period from the escape to the indictment on that offense. 509 F.2d at
771-73.
Cf. United States v. Bishton, 463 F.2d 887 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (sixth amendment not applicable
when government had not acted in bad faith). See supra note 70. But cf. United States v. Roberts,
548 F.2d 665 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 920 (1977) (speedy trial clause applied continu-
ously despite lack of prosecutorial bad faith). See supra note 71.
75. United States v. DeTiene, 468 F.2d 151, 155 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 911(1973); United States v. Nixon, 634 F.2d 306 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 120 (1981).
In DeTienne defendant jumped bail following his conviction for theft, forgery, and conspir-
acy. Following his arrest on a federal unlawful flight warrant, defendant was identified as a sus-
pect in an attempted bank robbery. One year later, defendant was indicted for attempted bank
robbery. In dismissing defendant's sixth amendment appeal, the Seventh Circuit refused to apply
the speedy trial clause from the date defendant was arrested on the escape warrant. The escape
was to avoid confinement on state offenses unrelated to the bank robbery attempts. 468 F.2d at
154-56.
In Nixon defendant was arrested for counterfeiting. After failing to discover physical evi-
dence of the crime, the prosecution dismissed the complaint. Nevertheless, the investigation con-
tinued. Based on new evidence, the Government opened grand jury proceedings in which
defendant testified to his innocence. One year later, the physical evidence necessary to implicate
defendant in the counterfeiting was discovered. Based on his grand jury testimony, defendant was
convicted of perjury four years after his counterfeiting arrest. Holding that the sixth amendment
remains applicable after charges are dismissed when the next charges are for the same offense, the
Fifth Circuit found that the perjury charge for which defendant ultimately was prosecuted did not
"gild" the counterfeiting charge underlying his original arrest. The court, therefore, did not en-
gage in a speedy trial analysis. 634 F.2d 307-10.
76. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
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Because of the paucity of relevant case law, the decision in MacDonald
turned on the interpretation given the language and purposes of the speedy
trial clause, and on the Court's decision in Klopfer. The language of the clause
could be interpreted to make the sixth amendment protection applicable "only
when a formal criminal charge is instituted and criminal prosectution be-
gins,"81 or to protect an "accused. .. until the government has completed its
attempts to try him for that crime."82
The speedy trial interests also are subject to differing interpretations. On
the one hand, applying the sixth amendment to the period between the dismis-
sal of charges and the return of an indictment might not serve those interests,
because the defendant then is like any other subject of a criminal investiga-
tion.83 On the other hand, applying the constitutional guarantee might serve
those interests because "[tlhe special anxiety a defendant suffers because of a
public accusation does not disappear simply because the initial charges are
temporarily dismissed."8 4
Furthermore, Klopfer can be construed in two diametrically opposed
manners. Klopfer is distinguishable from MacDonald because the charges
against defendant in Klopfer were never dismissed. Because defendant was
still under indictment, the statute of limitations remained tolled.85 Despite
this difference, however, the features distinguishing Klopfer from MacDonald
may be constitutionally insignificant. The lesson of Klopfer is "that the anxi-
ety suffered by an accused person, even after the prosecution has been termi-
nated and after he has been discharged from custody, warrants application of
the speedy trial protection. '8 6 Had the Court shifted its focus from indictment
formalities to the anxiety suffered by the accused, it might have found the
reasoning in Klopfer persuasive. The Supreme Court in MacDonald, however,
favored the "rights of public justice" over those of a defendant in a criminal
prosecution,8 7 and interpreted the speedy trial clause and Klopfer as requiring
that the sixth amendment be suspended once charges are dismissed.
In resolving this speedy trial question regarding the duration of the con-
stitutional protection, MacDonald created new problems in sixth amendment
jurisprudence through dictum suggesting that the result might have been dif-
ferent had the government acted in bad faith. One issue is the proper interpre-
tation of that dictum. 88 Because the bad faith dictum is subject to two
interpretations, confusion may result among the lower courts as they attempt
to comply with the MacDonald decision.
First, lower courts could find that the bad faith dictum should not be read
81. MacDonald, 102 S. Ct. at 1501.
82. Id. at 1505 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1502.
84. Id. at 1507 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 1502 n.8.
86. Id. at 1506 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905).
88. The dissenters called the dictum "puzzling" and did not consider it an element of the
Court's decision. 102 S. Ct. at 1508 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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into the holding. Were this interpretation adopted, defendants could not as-
sert speedy trial violations with respect to the period between charges. There-
fore, if the defendant could not demonstrate the actual prejudice necessary to
trigger the Lovasco due process analysis,8 9 the government could, in murder
cases, "delay a second prosecution for no reason" with impunity.90
Second, lower courts could find that the bad faith dictum qualifies the
holding.9 1 With this caveat governing its application, MacDonald is a flexible
decision in accordance with the Court's admonition against "allowing doctri-
naire concepts . . . to submerge the practical demands of the constitutional
right to a speedy trial." 92 Under this approach, courts could apply the Barker
balancing test to bad faith prosecutorial delay after the dismissal of the origi-
nal charges.
Although considering the bad faith dictum as a caveat to the MacDonald
holding might better serve the interests of justice by providing courts with the
doctrinal flexibility needed to deal with instances of prosecutorial misconduct,
this interpretation would call into question fundamental precepts of speedy
trial jurisprudence. Under Marion and Barker, the four-factor balancing test
for determining sixth amendment violations is applicable only to an accused.93
MacDonald, however, apparently held that a criminal defendant no longer is
an accused once charges are dismissed. 94 Therefore, applying the Barker
analysis to the period between charges would indicate that bad faith
prosecutorial delay either confers upon the defendant the status of an accused
or makes Barker applicable although the defendant is not an accused.
Assuming an exception should be made to established doctrine to accom-
modate the ends of justice, another issue is what constitutes the prosecutorial
bad faith necessary to trigger the Barker analysis. Reference to dictum in
Supreme Court cases and to the array of circuit court decisions construing
Marion and its progeny suggest four possible answers. The Barker balancing
test could be applied to the period between charges when the government: (1)
"dismissed and later reinstituted charges to evade the speedy trial guaran-
tee," 95 or (2) delayed prosecution solely "to gain a tactical advantage over the
89. In fact, MacDonald could not demonstrate the requisite prejudice. On remand, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected MacDonald's due process appeal. See supra note 26.
90. 102 S. Ct. at 1508 (Marshall, J. dissenting). A capital crime such as murder does not have
a statute of limitations. See 18 U.S.C. § 3281 (1976). Because defendants rarely prevail on due
process claims, see Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 796-97 (1971), the government conceivably could delay
prosecuting a murder with impunity. Most crimes, however, have a statute of limitations that
prevents the "bringing of overly stale criminal charges." United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122
(1966).
91. Thus qualified, the holding would be that absent proof of prosecutorial bad faith, claims
of speedy trial right violations in the period between accusations are not justiciable. For the im-
plications of such a holding for speedy trial jurisprudence, see infra text accompanying notes 93-
98.
92. 102 S. Ct. at 1510 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (quoting Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 381
(1969)). In Barker v. Wingo the Court also rejected an "inflexible" analytical framework. Barker,
407 U.S. 514, 517-18 (1972)
93. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55, 59-62.
94. 102 S. Ct. at 1502.
95. 102 S. Ct. at 1503 n.12. The Court implied that this constituted prosecutorial bad faith.
See id
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accused," 96 or (3) engaged in forum shopping or stockpiling charges, 97 or (4)
ultimately prosecuted the defendant for crimes that only gilded "the charge
underlying his initial arrest." 98
In conclusion, the Supreme Court in United States v. MacDonald was
faced with a difficult problem the parameters of which were not defined by
stare decisis. That problem was determining whether prosecutorial delay be-
tween the dismissal of military charges and the return of civilian indictment
violated the sixth amendment. The Court found that a defendant ceased to be
an accused once charges were dismissed and held that the sixth amendment
did not apply to the period between accusations. The Court's doctrinaire
holding resolved one gray area of speedy trial jurisprudence. The bad faith
dictum, however, once again muddied the waters of this "slippery" and
"amorphous" constitutional right. Because that dictum is subject to two inter-
pretations, there will be new confusion in speedy trial jurisprudence as the
lower courts attempt to follow the mandate of MacDonald.
ANDREW ELIOT FELDMAN
96. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325 (1971).
97. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
98. United States v. DeTienne, 468 F.2d 151,155 (7th Cir. 1972), cert denied, 410 U.S. 911
(1973). See also supra note 75.
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